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Cognitive psychological research focuses on causal learning and reasoning while cognitive
anthropological and social science research tend to focus on systems of beliefs. Our
aim was to explore how these two types of research can inform each other. Cognitive
psychological theories (causal model theory and causal Bayes nets) were used to
derive predictions for systems of causal beliefs. These predictions were then applied
to lay theories of depression as a specific test case. A systematic literature review on
causal beliefs about depression was conducted, including original, quantitative research.
Thirty-six studies investigating 13 non-Western and 32 Western cultural groups were
analyzed by classifying assumed causes and preferred forms of treatment into common
categories. Relations between beliefs and treatment preferences were assessed.
Substantial agreement between cultural groups was found with respect to the impact
of observable causes. Stress was generally rated as most important. Less agreement
resulted for hidden, especially supernatural causes. Causal beliefs were clearly related
to treatment preferences in Western groups, while evidence was mostly lacking for
non-Western groups. Overall predictions were supported, but there were considerable
methodological limitations. Pointers to future research, which may combine studies on
causal beliefs with experimental paradigms on causal reasoning, are given.
Keywords: causal learning and reasoning, causal beliefs, causal model theory, lay theories of depression,
cross-cultural differences
INTRODUCTION
Causal learning and reasoning appears to be a universal capac-
ity. Causal learning enables us to derive knowledge about generic
causal relations from observations and actions and to test
hypotheses about causal relations. Causal reasoning allows us to
explain events, to diagnose causes, and to predict future events
and unobserved features. For example, causal learning enables us
to find out which factors cause mental distress and impairment.
Causal reasoning allows us to diagnose the causes of current dis-
tress, to predict its future course, and to envision interventions
which may provide relief.
Causal learning, however, requires pre-existing causal knowl-
edge. Research in cognitive science has shown that causal learn-
ing from a limited amount of data is only feasible if there is
some higher order, abstract causal knowledge that constrains
the number of potential causal hypotheses (Kemp et al., 2010;
Tenenbaum et al., 2011). Only if a learner has some abstract
theory about which of the numerous observable variables are
candidate causes and which are possible effects, a small num-
ber of observations is sufficient to derive causal knowledge, that
is, generic causal beliefs that have a relevant degree of certainty.
For example, to find out what factors cause digestive problems,
it is important to know that (i) causes precede the symptoms
and that (ii) symptoms cannot be causes even when they are
observed simultaneously with or even before the condition. These
abstract causal beliefs represent fundamental concepts of causality
(Waldmann, 1996; White, 2006; Beller et al., 2009). In addition,
higher-order, domain-specific beliefs are relevant for learning.
For example, some basic medical knowledge tells us that physi-
cal injuries are not related to digestion, but nutrition and stress
might be.
Like causal learning, causal reasoning is also based on causal
knowledge, including higher-order theories about a domain (e.g.,
lay theories of illness) and specific causal beliefs about partic-
ular issues (e.g., beliefs about the causes of depression). For
example, to diagnose the cause of a person’s depressive symp-
toms, it is important to know that stress is a relevant causal
factor for disease in general. When it comes to problem solving
and decision making, causal knowledge may again be relevant.
Sometimes purely instrumental knowledge, that is, knowledge
about the consequences of actions, may be sufficient. But when no
respective instrumental knowledge is available, causal knowledge
may enable decision makers to choose the best course of action
(Sloman and Hagmayer, 2006; Hagmayer and Meder, 2013). For
example, persons with lactose intolerance usually know that tak-
ing lactase in advance prevents later digestive problems (instru-
mental knowledge), but only causal knowledge including at least
some vague idea about the mechanism by which lactase works,
allows us to infer that taking lactase after digestive problems have
already occurred will give some relief.
www.frontiersin.org November 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1303 | 1
Hagmayer and Engelmann Causal beliefs depression
Given that causal learning and reasoning and causal beliefs
are inherently connected to each other, it may seem surpris-
ing that cognitive-psychological research often disregards people’s
pre-existing causal beliefs when investigating causal learning and
reasoning. In order to study the underlying learning and reason-
ing processes, pre-existing domain-specific knowledge is usually
excluded by using abstract problems or by providing partici-
pants with knowledge about new, previously unknown causal
relations. These artificial scenarios ensure that participants can-
not rely on pre-existing knowledge to respond to the given tasks,
but have to actually engage in learning and/or reasoning based on
the observed data, general notions of causality and higher-order
theories. For example, in a landmark study on causal learning,
Waldmann and Holyoak (1992) asked US-students to learn the
relation between the disease Midosis and substances in the blood,
which were either introduced as causes or as effects of the disease.
Using the famous blocking paradigm, they showed participants
in a first learning phase that Substance 1 was present whenever
the disease was present. In a second learning phase they showed
participants that Substance 2 was present whenever Substance 1
and the disease were present. In a test phase participants had to
judge the likelihood of the disease given each of the substances.
It turned out that participants’ inferences were not only based on
the observed statistical relations, but also on assumptions about
the causal status of the substances. If they were assumed to be
effects of the disease, participants considered both substances to
be good predictors of the disease. By contrast, if substances were
believed to be causes of the disease, only Substance 1 was con-
sidered to be a good predictor, while participants were unsure
whether Substance 2 was a good predictor and therefore gave
intermediate ratings. In other words, Substance 2 was blocked by
Substance 1 only when they were assumed to be causes, but not
when they were assumed to be effects.
Cognitive anthropological studies, in contrast to cognitive psy-
chological research, often focus on studying systems of beliefs.
Causal beliefs (i.e., beliefs concerning causes, consequences, inter-
ventions, and causal mechanisms) are part of the belief systems
being explored. Respective research has been carried out in many
cultural groups, both Western and non-Western. For example,
Furnham (1988) explored people’s lay theories about the causes
of various medical conditions including depression, obesity, and
lung cancer in the UK and elsewhere. Murdock (1980) summa-
rized and analyzed previous anthropological work on lay medical
theories in cultural groups around the globe. Despite not inves-
tigating causal reasoning per se, respective research showed that
causal beliefs are related to other beliefs and actions. In the med-
ical domain, for example, causal beliefs were linked to attitudes
(e.g., stigma), to medical practices with respect to diagnosis and
treatment, to people’s expectations and predictions (e.g., progno-
sis of the course of an illness), and to actions (e.g., help seeking).
For instance, Okello and Ekblad (2006) investigated causal beliefs
about depression of the Ganda in Uganda. When witchcraft was
suspected as the cause of a person’s depression, the help of tradi-
tional healers was sought, while Western medicine was preferred
to address somatic causes and symptoms of depression.
Thus, cognitive-psychological research on causal cogni-
tion and research on causal beliefs, which is conducted by
anthropologists and other social scientists, yield important
insights on causal cognition. Nevertheless, these two research
traditions are still largely unconnected (cf. Beller, Bender and
Waldmann’s introduction to this special issue). An important
and still open question is how these two types of research can
best inform each other. Our aim in this paper is to provide first,
tentative answers to this question. First, we will explore the pre-
dictions that can be derived from cognitive psychological theories
on causal learning and reasoning for systems of causal beliefs.
We will then apply these predictions to a specific test case, lay
theories of depression. Expectations concerning similarities and
differences between cultural groups will be laid out. In order to
test these predictions, a systematic literature review of studies on
causal beliefs about depression will be presented. Findings will be
discussed and limitations will be pointed out. Finally, we will out-
line potential routes for future research, which combine studies
on causal beliefs with experimental paradigms from the research
on causal learning and reasoning.
PREDICTIONS FROM COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF
CAUSAL COGNITION FOR SYSTEMS OF CAUSAL BELIEFS
Many cognitive theories have been proposed to account for causal
learning and reasoning. Some of these theories have tried to
reduce causal reasoning to associative learning or probabilistic
reasoning, but failed to account for the abstract notions of causal-
ity that people bring to bear when reasoning causally (Waldmann
and Hagmayer, 2013). Therefore, we will focus on two classes of
theories, causal model theory (Waldmann, 1996; Sloman, 2005)
and Causal Bayes nets (Spirtes et al., 1993; Pearl, 2000; Glymour,
2001; Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2009), both of which assume
that people base causal reasoning on abstract notions of causality
and represent causal relations in their beliefs. Causal model the-
ory is a psychological theory, which aims to describe how people
actually learn and reason. Causal Bayes nets provide a ratio-
nal, computational model to formally describe causal induction,
knowledge, and reasoning. It models an optimal learner and per-
fectly rational causal thinker (Waldmann et al., 2008). Recently
causal Bayes nets have been used to formally describe mental
causal models and derive predictions to be tested empirically.
Empirical investigations to test these predictions with Western
students using artificial scenarios yielded mostly confirmatory
evidence (see Rottman and Hastie, 2014, for a comprehensive
overview).
Two other theories have to be mentioned first, though, as they
explain when and whereof people reason causally. Norm theory
(Kahneman and Miller, 1986) predicts that people will start to
search for causal explanations when observing events or instances
which violate norms, that is, expectations about what normally
happens. Counterfactual thinking is assumed to determine the
factor that caused the deviation. The abnormal conditions focus
model (Hilton and Slugoski, 1986) basically makes the same pre-
diction. Abnormal events are assumed to trigger causal analyses.
Research on counterfactual thinking has provided confirmatory
evidence for these predictions (cf. Roese, 1997). It also showed
that counterfactual deliberations are used to establish the cause
or causal contribution of a given factor to an event. Given that
successful causal inquiries result in causal beliefs, these theories
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imply that people should hold more causal beliefs concerning
abnormal than normal events. For example, people should hold
more beliefs about the causes of ill-health than about the causes
of good health. They also entail that people should hold similar
beliefs across different cultural groups as long as the same events
are considered abnormal in these groups.
Causal model theory (Waldmann, 1996; Sloman, 2005) and
causal Bayes nets (Pearl, 2000; Glymour, 2001) assume that causal
relations are represented as a set of beliefs about interconnected
causal relations. In other words, causal relations in the world are
represented as causal models. Causal models can be represented as
graphical models, more precisely as directed acyclic graphs, which
capture the asymmetry of causal relations (see Figure 1). Cause
and effect variables are represented as nodes, while causal rela-
tions are represented by causal arrows capturing the assumption
that there is a connecting causal mechanism by which the cause
influences the effect. These theories assume that causal beliefs rep-
resent generic, directed causal relations and notmerely associative
relations. They also assume that causal relations are represented at
the type level, that is, generic relations between types of events,
rather than at the token level, that is, causal relations between
individual instances. Hence, they entail that causal beliefs about
an issue are complex and concern types of causes, mechanisms,
and effects.
These theories, however, do not assume that people have
specific knowledge about a causal mechanism, even when they
assume that two variables are causally connected. Therefore,
people should have more specific beliefs about the causes and
consequences of a particular event or state than about the causal
mechanisms by which these are related. This prediction was sup-
ported by research on explanation in Western cultural groups,
which has shown that people often have only skeletal causal
knowledge (i.e., knowledge about causes and effects), but do not
know how the underlying causal mechanisms work (Rozenblit
and Keil, 2002). Nevertheless, these theories also entail that
assumptions about causal mechanisms should affect causal learn-
ing and reasoning whenever people hold such assumptions.When
no connecting mechanism is known, for example, two variables
should not be judged to be causally related even when they
are statistically related. Respective research with Western adults
(e.g., Koslowski, 1996) and children (Gopnik et al., 2004) yielded
confirmatory evidence.
Hierarchical Bayes nets (Tenenbaum et al., 2011) presume that
causal learning and reasoning is guided by general notions of
causality and higher-order causal theories of a domain. General
causal notions include the assumption that causes precede their
effects and that causes can influence their effects but not vice
versa. Higher-order, domain-specific causal theories are, for
example, the assumption that diseases cause observable symp-
toms and impairments. Research on computational modeling has
shown that such higher-order theories are necessary to constrain
the set of causal hypotheses when learning from limited amounts
of data (Tenenbaum et al., 2011). Hence this theory implies that
people should have a hierarchy of causal theories. It also pre-
dicts that mental causal models for particular topics (i.e., causal
beliefs with respect to a particular issue) should conform to the
respective higher-order theories. For example, causal models for
particular maladies (e.g., depression) should align withmore gen-
eral lay theories of illness held in a particular cultural group.
Of course, causal learning also depends on the observed data.
The induced causal model needs to explain the observations.
Consequently, differences in causal beliefs about particular issues
should arise either due to (i) differences in observations, or due to
(ii) differences in higher-order theories. When the environment
is roughly the same, then differences in causal beliefs about a par-
ticular topic should only be found when there are differences in
higher-order theories.
The observability of causes and the frequency with which
observations can be made should affect the beliefs being held.
When causes can be directly observed, then respective beliefs
can be induced rather easily from a few observations (Lagnado
and Sloman, 2002; Fernbach and Sloman, 2009). Therefore, peo-
ple in different cultural groups should hold similar causal beliefs
about observable causes, as long as the environments in which
they live, and thus the observations to be made, are the same.
However, when the observed factors cannot account for the events
to be explained, hidden causes have to be inferred from observ-
able clues. As the number of observations is often rather small,
there is generally a large number of hypotheses about unobserved
causes that may explain the data (Steyvers et al., 2003). In this
FIGURE 1 | Graphical causal models representing causal relations. On the left hand side an abstract, generic model is depicted, on the right hand side an
example for a simplified causal model of depression is presented. Nodes represent variables (events, states) and arrows represent directed causal relations.
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case, higher-order theories of a domain become more impor-
tant, as they constrain the number of potential causal hypotheses.
This entails that causal beliefs in different cultural groups should
align more with respect to observable causes than with respect to
unobservable causes. In addition, causal beliefs about observable
causes should be less affected by higher-order theories than causal
beliefs about hidden causes.
Higher-order theories, however, are not independent of the
observable evidence, but they are underdetermined by the evi-
dence (Kemp et al., 2010). Therefore, many higher order theo-
ries are compatible with a set of observations. For example, in
medicine a number of highly elaborate theories of illness have
been proposed (e.g., traditional Chinese medicine, Ayurvedic
medicine, Western bio-medical medicine). All of these systems
can account for a vast variety of observable illnesses and pro-
vide recommendations for—more or less—effective treatments.
Therefore, it is not surprising that all of these systems are cur-
rently used bymedical practitioners and are taught at universities.
By contrast, causal models of particular issues have to directly
conform to the observations made. Therefore, these models have
to be revised more frequently than higher-order theories to
account for new observations. This leads to the expectation that
across different cultural groups, less variability should be found
between causal models for particular issues than between higher-
order causal theories, as long as the environment in which the
groups live is roughly the same.
All theories of causal learning and reasoning assume that
causal knowledge is functional. It not only allows us to explain
events, but also to act and achieve goals. In other words, it not
only serves epistemic, but also pragmatic goals (cf. Wellen and
Danks, 2014). First, causal knowledge and reasoning can be used
to make a diagnostic judgment and/or categorize a certain case.
The causal model theory of categorization (Rehder and Hastie,
2001; Rehder, 2003) assumes that respective judgments are based
on assumptions about the causal relations within a category.
Based on the causal model of a category, the likelihood of observ-
ing a particular case can be derived. In turn, it can be inferred
how likely the observed case belongs to the respective category.
For example, when encountering a person showing symptoms of
depression, a causal model of depression can be used to judge
whether depression as an illness is present. This entails that
causal assumptions and not merely observed symptoms should
determine diagnostic judgments.
When it comes to decision making, people may resort to
instrumental knowledge about the efficacy of certain actions, and
choose the action which is most likely to yield the desired out-
come. But even when people have no instrumental knowledge,
causal knowledge and reasoning may prove to be very helpful as
it allows us to identify the factors that are most likely to make a
difference (cf. Sloman and Hagmayer, 2006). The causal model
theory of choice predicts that people choose their actions based
on a causal model of the given situation (Sloman and Hagmayer,
2006; Hagmayer and Sloman, 2009). To be more precise, people
are assumed to first retrieve the causal model of a particular issue
and instantiate it for the given case. Based on the model, simula-
tions can be run to predict the outcomes of potential actions. By
comparing the expected outcomes, the action can be selected that
has the highest likelihood of achieving the most desired goal state.
For example, when deciding on what to do in a case of depres-
sion, a causal model for a particular patient can be constructed
based on the decision maker’s causal beliefs and the information
provided by the affected person. This model can then be used to
predict whether social support is sufficient for the person to cope
with the condition she or he is in. If the depressive symptoms are
attributed to stress, social support is likely to be considered suffi-
cient. By contrast, when the symptoms are assumed to be caused
by persistent, depressogenic thinking styles, then some form of
psychotherapy is likely to be judged more effective.
To sum up, theories of causal learning and reasoning, more
precisely, causal model theories and causal Bayes nets, allow us
to derive predictions for systems of causal beliefs and poten-
tial differences and similarities between different cultural groups.
Table 1 provides an overview.
SYSTEMS OF CAUSAL BELIEFS—DEPRESSION AS A CASE STUDY
Lay theories of depression are an interesting case to test the pre-
dictions derived in the previous section. Depression is a mental
disorder that has a substantial prevalence in every country around
the globe investigated so far, with rates ranging between 7% in
Japan and round about 20% in the US and Western Europe
(WHO, 2013). It also creates a significant burden to patients
and their relatives (WHO, 2013). Second, there are higher-order
theories that may inform models of depression. These higher
order theories encompass theories of illness, which have been
found in all investigated cultural groups (Murdock, 1980), theo-
ries of the mind (i.e., lay theories of psychology), and/or theories
of mental distress (Sheik and Furnham, 2000). Third, depres-
sion is characterized by a set of directly observable symptoms,
which allow lay people to identify the illness. It presents with psy-
chological symptoms (depressed mood, anhedonia, and reduced
energy) and somatic symptoms (loss of appetite and weight, sleep
problems, digestive problems). Although there are differences in
how patients from different cultural groups first present them-
selves, the same symptoms are usually described when inquired
about (Kirmayer, 2001; Bhugra and Mastrogianni, 2004). Forth,
many different causes and risk factors have been established for
depression, including biological, psychological, social, and eco-
nomic factors (NICE, 2009). Some of these factors are directly
observable (e.g., poverty, marital problems), while others are not
(e.g., physiological parameters, genetic predisposition). In addi-
tion, depression sometimes seems to result from particular events
(e.g., post-partum depression, depression after stroke), while in
other cases there seems to be no specific causal trigger. Thus,
lay people should be able to learn about the observable causes
and they should infer hidden causes to account for the cases
in which there is no observable cause. Fifth, different types of
interventions have proved to be effective for depression, includ-
ing pharmacological treatments, psychotherapy and—in cases of
mild to moderate forms of depression—many types of psycho-
social interventions and activities on behalf of the patient (cf.
NICE, 2009). These findings entail that at least mild to moder-
ate cases could be successfully addressed by non-Western, non-
bio-medical treatments. Hence even lay people in non-Western
cultural groups having difficulties to access Western forms of
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Table 1 | Predictions derived from causal model theories and respective research for systems of causal beliefs in general and beliefs about
depression in particular.
Assumptions of causal model theories Predictions for systems of causal beliefs Predictions with respect to lay theories of
depression
Causal reasoning is triggered by
unexpected, abnormal events (Hilton and
Slugoski, 1986; Kahneman and Miller,
1986).
Causal beliefs concern abnormal conditions
more often than normal events or conditions.
Depression is a frequent, but abnormal condition.
Therefore, people across different cultural groups
should hold causal beliefs about depression.
Causal beliefs represent directed, generic
causal relations among cause and effect
variables (Waldmann, 1996).
Causal relations are not only represented on
the token level as relations among particular
instances, but also as causal laws, i.e., generic
causal relations, on a type level.
People across different cultural groups should have
assumptions about causal factors that generally lead to
depression.
Beliefs about individual causal relations
are integrated into more complex causal
models (Waldmann, 1996; Sloman, 2005).
Causal beliefs about a particular issue should
form complex causal models.
People across different cultural groups should have
interrelated beliefs about the causes, symptoms and
consequences of depression.
Mechanisms are represented by
mechanism placeholders, which represent
merely the presence of an interconnecting
mechanism (Pearl, 2000; Glymour, 2001).
Causal mechanisms are assumed to be
present or absent. Knowledge about causal
mechanisms is vague, often no details are
known.
People across different cultural groups should have
better knowledge about causal factors relevant for
depression than knowledge about the underlying
causal mechanisms.
Higher-order theories are necessary to
induce causal models for a particular issue
(Tenenbaum et al., 2011).
Causal models for specific issues conform to
higher-order theories.
People across different cultural groups should possess
higher-order theories, which inform models of
depression. Causal beliefs about depression should
align with these higher-order theories.
Higher-order theories are underdetermined
by observable evidence (Kemp et al.,
2010). Causal models of a particular issue
have to directly conform to observations.
Many different higher order theories might be
held and applied to a particular issue.
Causal models should align whenever
observations are similar.
Higher order theories may deviate between different
cultural groups. Higher order theories informing causal
models should deviate more strongly than causal
models of depression.
Observed causal relations in the world are
the basis for the induction of causal
beliefs. Inferred causal relations are as
simple as possible to account for the
observations made (Lagnado and Sloman,
2002; Fernbach and Sloman, 2009).
Hypotheses involving hidden causes are
generally underdetermined by the
observed data (Kemp et al., 2010).
Causal relations involving directly observable
variables are easier to learn than causal
models involving hidden variables that need to
be inferred.
Hidden causes are only inferred when
observations require to do so.
There is less agreement on hidden than
observable causes.
Causal models with respect to directly observable
causes and effects should be similar in different cultural
groups given that the environments in which they live
are similar.
As observable causes do not fully account for
depression, people across different cultural groups
should have assumptions about hidden factors that
contribute to depression.
People from different cultural groups should agree
more on observable causes than hidden causes of
depression.
Assumptions concerning the usage of
causal beliefs
Predictions Predictions with respect to depression
Categorization is based on beliefs about
the causal structure underlying a category
(Rehder and Hastie, 2001).
Diagnosis is based on assumptions about
causal structure underlying an illness (Kim
and Ahn, 2002).
Depending on assumptions about the
underlying causal structure, the same
instances may be categorized differently.
Depending on assumptions about the causes of
depressive symptoms and depression as an illness, the
same patient may be diagnosed as medically ill or not.
Patients should be more likely to be diagnosed as ill
when they present with symptoms that are causes of
other symptoms (e.g., depressive thinking style) or
symptoms that are caused by many other symptoms
(e.g., high level of distress).
Judgments are based on causal
knowledge when respective knowledge is
available (Garcia-Retamero and Hoffrage,
2006; Krynski and Tenenbaum, 2007;
Kahneman, 2011).
Causal beliefs may bias judgments when
probabilistic instead of causal judgments are
requested; causal knowledge may support
probabilistic judgments by giving meaning to
probabilistic information and allowing decision
Causal beliefs may contribute to the over-diagnosis of
depression, when the typical symptoms and causal
factors are present, despite a low base rate in the
respective groups of patients.
Causal beliefs may also lead to an under-diagnosis of
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Assumptions concerning the usage of
causal beliefs
Predictions Predictions with respect to depression
makers to integrate the information into a
causal model representation.
depression, when depressive symptoms are explained
away as normal reactions to transient conditions or
specific events.
Decisions on actions are based on causal
or instrumental knowledge (Hagmayer and
Sloman, 2009; Hagmayer and Meder,
2013).
Decision makers use causal knowledge to
infer the consequences of novel options.
Choices are based on the predicted causal
consequences.
Persons across different cultural groups should take their
beliefs about the causes of depression into account,
when rating and/or choosing a treatment for depression.
Therefore, preferences should agree with causal beliefs.
treatment should be able to learn something about effective treat-
ments for depression. Because of these reasons, depression seems
to be an appropriate test case to investigate the predictions of the-
ories of causal learning and reasoning for systems of causal beliefs
across cultures.
Table 1 (right hand column) summarizes the specific predic-
tions for the case of depression. Across different cultural groups
people should hold generic beliefs about the causes of depression,
and beliefs about observable causes should be similar as long as
the environment in which people live is roughly the same. In
consequence, treatment preferences should tend to align across
different groups when depression is attributed to these observable
causes. Differences between cultural groups are expected when
environments differ. Differences despite similar environments
are expected for: (i) Higher-order theories, which inform causal
models of depression, (ii) assumptions about hidden causes of
depression (which are informed by higher-order theories), and
(iii) treatment preferences when hidden causes are assumed to be
responsible for the observable symptoms. The literature review
presented in the next section will show whether these predictions
are supported empirically.
METHODS
We conducted a systematic review of the literature on lay theories
of depression following the methodology used in the medi-
cal sciences (cf. Glasziou et al., 2001). It is important to note
that none of the studies reviewed here were conducted to test
the predictions derived in the previous sections (cf. Table 1).
Studies in general aimed to investigate causal and non-causal
beliefs about depression and to relate these beliefs to treatment
preferences.
SEARCH STRATEGY
Three databases (Embase, Medline, and Psychinfo) were searched
using the following search terms: Depress* AND (explanatory
model OR illness perception OR caus* model OR caus* belief*
OR lay theory). All publications up to September 2012 were con-
sidered. Five-hundred-eighty-six papers were found after remov-
ing duplicates. By screening titles and abstracts, papers obvi-
ously not meeting the previously specified inclusion criteria (see
Table 2) were excluded, which reduced the number of publi-
cations to 55. These papers were read and reference lists were
screened for further potentially relevant publications. Seven fur-
ther publications were identified this way. Of these 62 studies, 36
met the inclusion criteria, while 26 were excluded; three papers
(Patel, 1995; Lobban et al., 2003; Angermeyer and Dietrich, 2006)
for being reviews, the other papers for presenting no or only
incomplete statistical analyses of collected data.
We decided not to include publications presenting only quali-
tative results concerning causal beliefs, because participants from
all investigated cultural groups tended to assume a large variety of
potential causes. Hence, differences between groups could hardly
be judged. Only quantitative data allowed us to rank order cat-
egories of causes and thereby assess similarities and differences
between groups systematically. However, this decision favored
non-anthropological over anthropological studies, which tended
to be more qualitative in nature (e.g., Kleinman, 1977). This issue
is further discussed in section Limitations.
ANALYSIS OF SELECTED PAPERS
All papers were analyzed using a pre-defined scheme (see
Table 3). First the samples were classified into Western (W)
and Non-Western (NW). Some of the non-Western groups were
investigated in Western countries (e.g., Chinese Americans or
Yoruba people from Nigeria living in the UK). Participants were
classified as general population (G), patients (P), relations of
patients (RP), students (S) and others (O) (e.g., members of self-
help organizations and other specific groups of people). Sample
sizes of respective groups are given in Table 3. Methods used to
diagnose patients were classified into questionnaires (Q), and/or
interviews (I). Some studies presented participants with case
vignettes describing persons with depression. In most studies,
a single vignette was used describing typical psychological and
somatic symptoms of depression according to the International
Classification of Disease (WHO, 2010) or the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM IV, APA, 2000). Methods used to investi-
gate the conceptualization of depression as an illness vs. no illness
or as a biomedical vs. mental illness were also classified into inter-
views (I) or questionnaires (Q). Frequently explanatory model
interviews based on Kleinman (1977, 1980) were conducted.
Popular questionnaires were Reasons for Depression (Addis et al.,
1995), and the Illness Perception Questionnaire (IPQ), which was
adapted to depression (Brown et al., 2001). Results with respect to
four variables were assessed: (i) the conceptualization of depres-
sion, (ii) beliefs about the causes of depression, (iii) preferences
with respect to treatment, and (iv) relations between concep-
tualization and assumed causes on one hand and treatment
preferences on the other hand. Not all of these variables were
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Table 2 | Inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
Design: Empirical study investigating causal beliefs with respect to
depression (original research)
Participants: Lay-people including patients and their relatives, single or
multiple cultural groups
Method: Systematic assessment of causal beliefs through interviews
following a protocol or standardized questionnaires
Results: Presentation of quantitative results on causal beliefs: rating or
ranking of importance of causes or percentage of persons endorsing
each causal factor
Case studies concerning a single or very few individuals, reviews,
narrative accounts
Publications not presenting original research
Studies on causal beliefs with respect to mental distress or mental
disorders in general
Studies with mental health professionals: e.g., physicians, psychiatrists,
nurses, healers
Studies presenting qualitative results only, i.e., lists of potential causes
without further quantitative information
Studies presenting incomplete quantitative results
measured in all studies. Beliefs about causes were rank-ordered
based on either the frequency with which a particular cause was
mentioned by interviewees or the ratings given in questionnaires.
The same procedure was used for treatment preferences.
To enable comparisons between cultural groups, assumed
causes were then classified into five categories: (i) stress (i.e.,
environmental factors stressing the person); (ii) personality and
psychological causes; (iii) biological, (iv) supernatural, and (v)
traditional causes. The classification of causes into natural vs.
supernatural causes was adapted fromMurdock (1980), who used
the same differentiation for causes of medical illnesses. Typical
examples for stress were economic hardship, marriage problems,
work overload and career failure; examples for personality and
psychological causes were thinking too much, lack of willpower
and low resilience, examples for biological causes were chemical
imbalances in the brain, genetic factors and “nerves,” and exam-
ples for supernatural causes were witchcraft, spirits and god’s will.
Traditional causes were causes according to non-Western med-
ical theories. Such theories are found in India (Umma, Siddha,
and Ayurvedic medicine) and in China (traditional Chinese
medicine). Treatments were classified into five categories: (i)
psychological treatment (e.g., psychotherapy, counseling); (ii)
social support (i.e., non-professional support by family and
friends); (iii) bio-medical treatment (e.g., antidepressant medica-
tion); (iv) religion or supernatural practices (e.g., praying, rituals
against witchcraft), and (v) non-Western medicine or alternative
treatment (e.g., Ayurvedic treatments, yoga).
RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS
It is not possible—and not necessary for the aim of this paper—
to present all data with respect to conceptualizations, assumed
causes and preferred treatments here. Table 4 exemplifies the
causes and treatments ranked highest in the studies on non-
Western cultural groups. Note that categories of causes and
treatments presented in Table 4 were adopted from the respective
authors. Hence they do not necessarily align with each other. A
wide variety of causal factors were mentioned within and between
groups. Some of these factors were culture-specific (e.g., karma in
India, or ancestral spirits in sub-Saharan Africa) while others were
found in virtually all groups (e.g., stress due to family issues and
economic hardship).
Similarities and differences within and between cultural
groups became more apparent when causes and treatments
were re-classified using the same category scheme and cate-
gories were rank-ordered. Table 5 shows the respective results
for both Western and non-Western cultural groups. The overall
rank order of cause categories was very similar across cultural
groups. On average, stress due to environmental factors (e.g.,
family or job-related issues) was considered to be themost impor-
tant cause, followed by psychological causes, biological causes and
supernatural causes, although only one study on Western groups
investigated the last category. But there was substantial variation
between cultural groups, especially with respect to psychological,
biological and—for non-Western cultural groups—supernatural
causes. Some of these variations may be due to methodological
differences (e.g., the specific causes inquired about or the setting
in which the study was conducted); others probably reflect actual
differences in beliefs.
More disagreement was found with respect to treatment pref-
erences (see Table 5 right hand side). Western cultural groups
preferred psychological treatments (mostly psychotherapy) and
social support over bio-medical treatments, which is in line
with their causal beliefs that stress and psychological causes
contribute the most to depression. A majority of non-Western
groups preferred bio-medical treatments followed by social sup-
port. Religious and supernatural practices came in third ahead
of traditional treatments and psychotherapy. These results, how-
ever, have to be put in context. Psychological treatments are often
unavailable and therefore little known to people in non-Western
countries. In addition, a number of studies—especially stud-
ies on patients—were conducted in clinics offering bio-medical
treatments, which may bias participants’ evaluations.
RESULTS CONCERNING SPECIFIC PREDICTIONS
The first prediction was that people across different cultural
groups should have causal beliefs about depression, because it is a
frequent, but abnormal condition that affords an explanation. A
vast majority of people had assumptions about the causal factors
that lead to or contribute to depression. Only 0–7% claimed that
they did not know about the causes. Participants tended to have
more difficulties to provide a cause when depression co-occurred
with psychotic symptoms (Swami et al., 2010). This is in line with
other studies showing that people know less about more severe
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Table 3 | Overview of publications meeting inclusion criteria and description of methodological details of studies.


























































































































































Aidoo and Harpham, 2001 Zambia NW O 139 Q No I_EM I_EM    
Addis et al., 1995 USA W S 602 Q, I No Q_RFD 
USA W P 133 No Q_RFD 
Addis and Jacobson, 1996 USA W P 98 Q, I No Q_RFD 
Beck et al., 2003 Germany(Year 1990) W G 5025 Yes I I   
Germany(Year 2001) W G 3098 Yes I I   
Boogaard et al., 2011 Netherlands W P 120 Q, I No Q  
Brown et al., 2001 USA W P 41 Q No Q_IPQ Q_IPQ    
Brown et al., 2007 USA W P 191 Q, I No Q_IPQ Q_IPQ   
Budd et al., 2008 UK W O 164 No Q Q   
Carter et al., 2011 New Zealand W P 177 Q, I No Q_RFD 
Cornwall et al., 2005 UK W P 15 Q No Q_RFD 
UK W RP 15 Q No Q_RFD 
Dunlop et al., 2012 USA W P 80 Q, I No Q Q   
Fortune et al., 2004 UK W P 101 Q No Q_IPQ 
Furnham and Kuyken, 1991 UK W G 201 No Q 
Goldstein and Rosselli, 2003 USA W S 66 No Q Q   
Grover et al., 2012 India NW P 164 Unclear No I_EM 
Jadhav et al., 2001 UK W P 47 Q No I_EM  
Jorm et al., 1997 Australia W G 1010 Yes I 
Jorm et al., 2005a Australia W G 910 Yes I 
Jorm et al., 2005b Australia W G 3998 Yes I I  
Japan NW G 2000 Yes I I  
Karasz et al., 2009 USA W P 74 Q No I I   
Khalsa et al., 2011 USA W P 145 Q, I No Q_RFD Q   
Kirk et al., 1999 USA W G 25 No Q Q  
USA W P 25 Q, I No Q Q  
Kuyken, 1992 UK W G 49 No Q, I Q, I  
UK W P 20 Q, I No Q, I Q, I 
Kwong et al., 2012 USA NW P 42 Q No I_EM I_EM  
Lauber et al., 2003 Switzerland W G 873 Yes I  
Lavender et al., 2006 UK NW G 20 Yes I I 
UK NW G 20 Yes I I   
UK W G 20 Yes I I  
Lynch and Medin, 2006 USA W S 23 No I  
McKeon and Carrick, 1991 Ireland W G 1403 No I I 
Nieuwsma et al., 2011 USA NW S 92 No Q, I_EM Q, I_EM    
USA W S 97 No Q, I_EM Q, I_EM  
Raguram et al., 2001 India NW P 80 I No I_EM I_EM  
Shankar et al., 2006 India NW P 72 I Yes I I   
Swami et al., 2010 Malaysia NW G urban 189 Yes Q Q    
Malaysia NW G non-urban 153 Yes Q Q    
Tully et al., 2006 Australia W P 392 Q No Q 
Yeung et al., 2004 USA NW P 29 Q, I No I_EM I_EM   
Ying, 1990 USA NW G 40 Yes I_EM I_EM    
Note: Participants were classified as general population (G), students (S), patients (P), relatives/spouses of patients (RP) or other (O). Cultural groups were classified
as Western (W) and non-Western (NW). Methods used to diagnose patients were classified into questionnaire (Q), clinical interview (CI) or other (O). Methods used
to assess conceptualizations, assumed causes and preferred treatments were classified into interviews (I) or questionnaires (Q), Explanatory Model interviews are
marked as I_EM, Reasons for Depression questionnaire studies by Q_RFD and Illness perception Questionnaire studies by Q_IPQ. Check marks indicate that the
respective variable was investigated.
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s N 12 11 9 9 4 5 11 8 9 5
Rank 1 67% 18% 22% 22% 20% 55% 38% 22%
Rank 2 25% 55% 33% 11% 20% 27% 50% 22% 20%
Rank 3 27% 33% 44% 9% 13% 22% 80%
Rank 4 8% 11% 50% 40% 9% 11%
Rank 5 22% 50% 20%
Mean Rank 1.5 2.1 2.3 2.9 4.5 3.2 1.7 1.8 2.8 2.8












s N 30 35 29 1 N/A 19 19 9 3 6
Rank 1 60% 40% 10% 63% 21% 44% 33% 17%
Rank 2 30% 40% 38% 26% 47% 22% 33% 50%
Rank 3 10% 20% 52% 11% 32% 33%
Rank 4 100% 33%
Rank 5 33%
Mean Rank 1.5 1.8 2.4 4.0 1.5 2.1 1.9 2.7 2.5
Overall Rank 1 2 3 4 1 3 2 5 4
Note: Overall ranks were based on mean ranks.
forms of mental illness. For example, a review on lay theories
of schizophrenia (Angermeyer and Dietrich, 2006), found that
between 5 and 15% of respondents had no respective knowledge.
The second prediction was that people across different cultural
groups should have assumptions about generic causal factors for
depression and that these beliefs form complex causal models.
More than 90% of participants in interview studies named more
than one cause of depression. The same is true for participants
responding to questionnaires which endorsed more than one
causal factor as relevant for depression in general or for a specific
case. Hence, people seem to have complex causal beliefs regardless
of cultural background.
The third prediction was that people should have more and
more specific beliefs concerning causal factors than causal mech-
anisms. The results of the reviewed studies hardly allow us to
make an informed judgment at this point. This is mostly due to
methodological limitations. Both questionnaires and interviews
inquired about causes of depression. Therefore, it is not surprising
that respondents hardly mentioned specific causal mechanisms
and gave no details about these mechanisms. One exception was
cognitive mechanisms referring to rumination or thinking too
much, which were reported by studies on Western and non-
Western groups. Another exception was vague descriptions of
Western and non-Western physiological processes in some of
the questionnaire studies (e.g., chemical imbalances in the brain
or humoral imbalances), which tended to be endorsed by some
responders.
The fourth set of predictions concerned higher-order theories,
which should inform causal models of depression. None of the
studies reviewed here directly investigated higher-order theories
and their implications for causal models of depression in dif-
ferent cultural groups. Some indirect evidence, however, comes
from Indian studies, which often identified karma as a relevant
cause of depression (see Table 4). Karma has to be considered
an abstract theory (karma-deed-heredity), which accounts for
many events and conditions including mental and other illnesses.
Thus, Indian participants seem to have used this higher-order
theory to causally explain cases of depression. There is at least one
study outside this review, which directly addressed the question of
higher-order theories. Patel (1995) investigated how lay theories
of mental illness are shaped by abstract causal beliefs in sub-
Saharan Africa. General assumptions held by people in this area
seem to be that (i) all things and events have a cause with a greater
power than the event/thing itself and (ii) that all events with high
importance or impact are also caused by an intentional agent.
It is believed that spirits (ancestral and others) and witchcraft
can cause or at least influence events. While proximate causes
are believed to explain how an event was generated, only ulti-
mate causes are assumed to explain why a certain event happened.
These general notions about causation and causal explanation
explain why people in sub-Saharan Africa assumemental illnesses
to be caused by social, economic, and/or biological factors (prox-
imate causes) and supernatural causes like spirits and witchcraft
(ultimate causes) at the same time.
The fifth prediction was that higher-order theories of different
cultural groups should deviate more from each other than causal
models of depression. Again no direct evidence is available at this
moment. There are some clues, however, that may support this
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prediction. Academic medical theories (e.g., Western bio-medical
vs. Ayurvedic vs. traditional Chinese medicine) and lay theories of
illness deviate very profoundly from each other (Murdock, 1980),
while the results presented here point toward a considerable
amount of agreement about the causes of depression.
The sixth prediction was that people across different cul-
tural groups would have assumptions about hidden, not directly
observable causes. In virtually all studies participants assumed
biological and/or supernatural causes of depression. Biological
causes include physiological, nervous, and/or genetic factors or
processes. These causes are not directly observable by lay peo-
ple. Supernatural causes are generally assumed to be not directly
observable, although they might be considered directly perceiv-
able in some cultural groups. There seems to be some agreement,
however, that the presence of a supernatural cause in a particular
case has to be inferred from observable clues.
The seventh prediction was that participants from different
cultural groups should agree more on observable causes than
hidden causes. This prediction seems to be supported by the
results shown in Table 5. Stress due to environmental factors was
endorsed by all investigated cultural groups as themost important
type of factor. These environmental factors are easily observable.
The second most important factors were personality and psycho-
logical causes, which can be assessed through communication,
followed by biological and supernatural causes. The order was the
same for Western and Non-Western groups although there were
differences within groups.
A number of predictions were derived concerning the usage
of causal beliefs for categorization, diagnostic reasoning, judg-
ment and decision making. Unfortunately none of the studies
reviewed here directly investigated the impact of causal beliefs on
categorization and diagnostic reasoning. In order to do so, par-
ticipants would have to be presented with several, especially con-
structed cases and several judgments would have to be collected.
Respective researchmethods exist and have been successfully used
to investigate how causal assumptions of Western mental health
professionals and students affect diagnostic judgments and deci-
sion making (e.g., Kim and Ahn, 2002; DeKwaadsteniet et al.,
2010). For example, Kim and Ahn (2002) asked their participants
(students and psychologists) to describe how the diagnostic indi-
cators of various mental disorders are causally related to each
other. Based on the individual causal models, they constructed
case vignettes of patients which had symptoms that were either
causes of other symptoms, effects of other symptoms, or were
causally not related to other symptoms. It turned out that patients
with symptoms being causes of other symptoms were judged as
more likely to have the disorder than patients showing symptoms
being effects or symptoms being causally unrelated. This find-
ing is surprising, because Western mental health professionals are
trained to consider all diagnostic indicators as equally important
(cf. DSM IV, APA, 2000).
One important prediction of causal model theories of deci-
sion making is that people should take causal beliefs into account
when deciding on actions (e.g., Sloman and Hagmayer, 2006).
The relation between causal beliefs and ratings of treatments were
investigated by statistical methods in 11 of the studies reviewed
here. For the Western cultural groups, several studies found
statistically significant relations. Dunlop et al. (2012) showed that
people who attributed depression to chance or fate prefered to
refrain from treatment. People who conceptualized depression as
an emotional illness preferred cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT)
over medication, while those who considered it a physical ill-
ness preferred medication. Khalsa et al. (2011) reported a relation
between beliefs in biological causes and a preference for medi-
cation, and a relation between beliefs in childhood causes and a
preference for psychotherapy. McKeon and Carrick (1991) found
a positive correlation of beliefs in biological causation and per-
ceived helpfulness of medication. Budd et al. (2008) reported
the same finding. By contrast, Goldstein and Rosselli (2003)
found that a belief in biological causes was related to a pref-
erence for CBT. Brown et al. (2007) showed that a belief in
bio-medical and environmental causes was related to perceiving
less control over the condition. Brown et al. (2001) found that
people who assumed interpersonal difficulties to be an impor-
tant cause adhered less to medical treatments. Boogaard et al.
(2011) reported that people, who believed in childhood issues
and intra-psychic fears as causes, tended to be in treatment for a
longer period of time. Two studies even found a relation between
causal beliefs and treatment outcomes (Addis and Jacobson, 1996;
Carter et al., 2011). For example, Carter et al. (2011) showed that
patients who believed that interpersonal conflicts are the cause of
their depression profited more from interpersonal therapy than
from cognitive behavioral therapy.
Only two studies on non-Western cultural groups directly
investigated the relation, while others merely claimed their pres-
ence (see Table 4). Swami et al. (2010) found small but significant
correlations among beliefs and ratings of treatments, but they
tended to vary considerably between urban and rural Malay
people. Those who believed more in external causes tended to
rate rest and change of diet as more effective, while those who
believed more strongly in supernatural causes endorsed religion
as a treatment more than others. Ying (1990) found for a Chinese
American sample that 30% of those who assumed psychological
causes sought professional help from psychologists, while 75%
of those who believed in physical causes looked for help from
a physician. Other studies pointed out that (i) a belief in super-
natural causes was related to respective activities and treatments
(Lavender et al., 2006) and that (ii) a belief in a medical illness
was related to a preference for bio-medical treatments (Aidoo
and Harpham, 2001; Shankar et al., 2006). The summary pre-
sented in Table 5, however, indicates a discrepancy between the
moderate belief in biological causation and the strong prefer-
ence for bio-medical treatment. As pointed out above, there are
several possible explanations for this finding. Patients may have
tried other forms of treatment, being more consistent with their
beliefs, before resorting to bio-medical treatment. Another might
be that other services, especially psychotherapy or counseling are
not available. In addition, the costs of different forms of treatment
may have affected preferences beyond causal considerations.
In sum, many of the predictions derived from causal model
theories of causal reasoning and/or causal Bayes nets were sup-
ported by the empirical evidence on lay theories of depression.
There is, however, a considerable lack of evidence with respect
to two crucial aspects. First, the interplay between higher-order
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theories of causation and illness and causal models of specific
conditions like depression has not been investigated. Second, the
influence of causal beliefs on categorization and reasoning has not
been explored and the evidence with respect to decision making
is still scarce, especially in non-Western cultural groups.
DISCUSSION
The present paper explored how cognitive psychological theo-
ries of causal learning and reasoning can inform research on
systems of (causal) beliefs in different cultural groups. Based
on causal model theories (Waldmann, 1996; Sloman, 2005) and
causal Bayes net theories (Pearl, 2000; Glymour, 2001; Griffiths
and Tenenbaum, 2009; Tenenbaum et al., 2011) predictions for
systems of causal beliefs were derived. These predictions were
applied to lay theories of depression. Lay theories of depres-
sion seemed to be an appropriate test case, as depression is
present globally with a substantial prevalence and a common
core of somatic and psychological symptoms. Established causes
include both observable and non-observable factors. Therefore,
all derived predictions could be tested. Most predictions entailed
a similarity between different cultural groups. Differences in
beliefs were only expected with respect to higher-order the-
ories and inferred hidden causes. It was also predicted that
causal beliefs should affect the categorization and diagnosis of
depression as well as preferences and decisions with respect to
treatment.
A systematic literature review on lay theories of depression
was conducted and eligible papers were analyzed systematically
by classifying assumed causes and preferred treatments into
common categories. Results showed that members of all inves-
tigated cultural groups held causal beliefs about generic causes
of depression and that beliefs constituted complex causal models.
As predicted, substantial agreement was found between differ-
ent cultural groups with respect to easily observable causes of
depression, that is, stress due to environmental factors like mari-
tal problems and psychological variables like depressive thinking
styles. Less agreement resulted for hidden causes. Substantial dif-
ferences were found with respect to supernatural causes between
Western and non-Western cultural groups and between differ-
ent non-Western groups. Many of these beliefs seemed to be
culture-specific (e.g., the role of karma or the influence of ances-
tral spirits). Assumptions about these causes also seemed to
be informed by higher-order theories of causation and illness,
although none of the reviewed studies directly investigated this
relation empirically.
The usage of causal beliefs in reasoning and decision mak-
ing has rarely been explored systematically. Especially evidence
from non-Western cultural groups is lacking. When investigated,
rather good agreement between causal beliefs and treatment pref-
erences were found for Western cultural groups. The few results
for non-Western groups appear to be mixed. It seems that other
factors apart from causal beliefs may have an important impact
on treatment preferences as well.
Taken together, the results tend to support the derived pre-
dictions. This indicates that cognitive psychological theories of
causal learning and reasoning can be used to derive testable
predictions for systems of causal beliefs.
LIMITATIONS
There are a number of limitations that need to be pointed out.
First, there are limitations concerning the systematic literature
review. Only publications describing original research on causal
beliefs about depression were included. In addition, studies had to
present quantitative results. We deliberately constrained ourselves
to quantitative studies in order to be able to rank order causes for
importance. Purely qualitative studies were therefore excluded. In
consequence, more studies on non-Western cultural groups were
excluded than studies on Western cultural groups. This is partic-
ular unfortunate as—for example—studies investigating cultural
groups in Iran (Dejman et al., 2010), Uganda (Okello and Ekblad,
2006), and Vietnam (Niemi et al., 2009) were not considered. The
same is true for studies looking at different religious groups liv-
ing in the same country (e.g., Loewenthal and Cinnirella, 1999).
However, these studies reported similar findings as the studies
reviewed here. One exception seems to be that religious or spiri-
tual people tended to believemore strongly in supernatural causes
(e.g., loss of faith) and endorsed respective practices for treatment
in both Western and non-Western groups (Wittink et al., 2009).
Studies included in this review were published in medical,
medical-anthropological, social science and psychology journals.
We cross-checked reference lists for further relevant publications.
We are not aware of missing important empirical, quantita-
tive studies published elsewhere. Despite this effort, hardly any
anthropological studies ended up in this review. This is proba-
bly due to our focus on quantitative studies. Another reason is
that the searched databases only encompass a few journals pub-
lishing anthropological research, although Medical Anthropology,
Transcultural Psychiatry, and Social Science and Medicine seem
to be the major outlets for work on lay concepts and theories
of depression and other mental illnesses. A third reason may
be that we concentrated on a specific mental disorder. It might
well be that anthropologists take a broader perspective and look
at theories of mental illness or mental distress instead of par-
ticular diseases (e.g., Kleinman, 1980; Kirmayer and Valaskakis,
2008). The reason, however, may be more fundamental. Beller
et al. (2012) pointed out that cognitive science and anthropology
might be incompatible with respect to perspective and methods.
Therefore, findings from anthropology may be difficult to use to
test predictions derived from cognitive psychological theories.
Second, there are limitations concerning the methodological
rigor of the reported studies. All studies reviewed here system-
atically assessed participants’ causal beliefs, which is good. But
not all studies presented participants with case descriptions of
depression. Therefore, it is not clear that all participants had
the same understanding of the term “depression.” Some of the
non-Western cultural groups lived in Western countries, which
may have changed their beliefs about depression. In fact, some
Yoruba people pointed out that they would give different answers
depending on whether they were in the UK or Nigeria (Lavender
et al., 2006). Hence differences between Western and non-
Western cultural groups may be underestimated. Unfortunately,
the relation between assumed causes and treatment preferences
were only assessed in limited number of studies. Found correla-
tions were generally low to moderate. Error accumulation due to
the large number of statistical tests was almost never taken into
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account. Hence, the statistical validity of the results has to be rated
as rather moderate.
Finally, we only tested the predictions derived from cognitive-
psychological theories with respect to causal beliefs on depres-
sion. It might be that lay theories of depression are different from
other lay theories. Although we cannot exclude this possibility,
our results seem to be in line with lay theories about other top-
ics (cf. Furnham, 1988). Nevertheless, more evidence on other
systems of causal beliefs is needed to corroborate the present
findings.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The review identified two areas of research, which merit further
attention by researchers investigating causal cognition in different
cultural groups. One area is the interplay between higher-order
theories and causal models for particular issues. Higher-order
theories include general notions of causation and general theories
of a domain (e.g., lay theories of illness). Although more general
lay theories have been investigated (e.g., Furnham, 1988), there is
little research on how theories on different levels of abstraction
interact with each other and the observable evidence in differ-
ent cultural groups. Hierarchical Bayes nets (Tenenbaum et al.,
2011) allow us to derive specific predictions for the causal mod-
els people will induce from a set of observations and respective
higher-order theories. In order to conduct respective experimen-
tal studies a multi-method approach seems to be advisable. A
triangulation approach (Atran and Medin, 2009) would allow us
to properly investigate the influence of different cultural back-
grounds on higher level theories. For example, theories of skin
diseases could be assessed in Western and Indian groups in the
UK and in India. This way country and cultural background
could be disentangled. In a research study, first higher level theo-
ries could be assessed using interviews. Respective methodologies
have already been developed in anthropology and cultural psy-
chology (e.g., Kleinman, 1980; Weiss et al., 1992; Atran and
Medin, 2009). Based on the interviews, lay theories could be
reconstructed on the group and the individual level. In a sec-
ond step, participants in the study could be confronted with
a series of cases showing a new, previously unknown medical
condition. Dermatological problems seem to be a good starting
point as there are many forms. Hence new forms can be cre-
ated easily without violating general expectations. In addition,
dermatological problems have many different causes (e.g., aller-
gic reactions, cancer, somatization problems). Like in the case of
depression, some of these causes are directly observable, while
others are hidden. This would allow researchers to manipulate the
data presented to participants. Data can be presented as descrip-
tions of individual cases, which would ease understanding. Data
may show a contingency between an observable cause (e.g., a new
type of clothing) and the condition to be explained (e.g., itchy
dark purple spots in the arm pit, which start to bleed later on) or
the observable causes may be unrelated to the symptoms. After
hearing (or reading) about a series of cases, participants would
be asked to explain either a typical single case or to provide a
generic explanation of the problem. Hence participants would be
asked about their theory of the illness on a token (specific sin-
gle case) and a type level (generic model). One prediction to be
tested would be that explanations are more strongly influenced
by the observed data when observable causes were related to the
condition, but more strongly affected by higher level theories of
illness and skin problems when there were no contingent observ-
able causes. In addition to experimental research, real world test
cases could be explored. An interesting, historic test case may be
people’s causal beliefs about AIDS when the respective syndrome
first grabbed the public’s attention. Another example is bovine
spongiform encephalitis (BSE, mad cow’s disease) and variant
Creuzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD, the human version of BSE),
which also initially created a puzzle for experts and lay-people.
In both cases it is predicted that people resorted to higher-order
theories about illness to account for the observed syndrome.
The second area of interesting future research concerns the
usage of causal beliefs for categorization, diagnosis, progno-
sis, and decision making. There is already some evidence that
folk ecological causal beliefs affect categorization and deci-
sion making (cf. Atran and Medin, 2009), but more evidence
from different domains and different cultures would be inter-
esting. Experimental and non-experimental research could pro-
vide important insights. While non-experimental research would
show whether decisions and judgments are coherent with causal
beliefs, experimental research could showwhether, when and how
causal beliefs affect judgments and decisions. Cognitive psychol-
ogy provides a wealth of experimental paradigms to study causal
reasoning in experts and lay-people in a rigorous manner. Such
experimental research allows us to distinguish between judgments
and decisions that are merely recalled from memory and judg-
ments and decisions that are based on reasoning.When a decision
can be recalled from memory, because it had been taken under
the same circumstances before, no causal reasoning is necessary.
Only when no judgment or decision is known right away, causal
reasoning based upon pre-existing causal beliefs and the observed
situation may become relevant (cf. Sloman and Hagmayer, 2006;
Hagmayer and Sloman, 2009). Hence, if we want to study causal
reasoning of lay-people in everyday contexts, we need to cre-
ate novel, but meaningful scenarios, in which they can resort to
their causal knowledge, but do not necessarily have to. The work
by Kim and Ahn (2002) is a good example for well controlled
experimental research. In these studies, participants’ causal beliefs
about mental illnesses were assessed individually before they
were confronted with novel judgment and decision problems,
which were created based on their idiosyncratic causal beliefs.
For example, participants were asked to diagnose new patients,
which conformed to different degrees to the causal assumptions
held by the individual participant. One may argue, however,
that the materials presented to participants in these studies were
still impoverished in comparison to real life complexity. This
is true, but the basic paradigm could be extended respectively.
Using well established interview techniques (e.g., Kleinman, 1980;
Atran and Medin, 2009), explanatory models of—for example—
particular mental or somatic diseases could be assessed. Based
on these models, different and complex case vignettes could be
created. These case vignettes could either describe prototypical
cases, which show all expected symptoms, or cases, which show
only a subset of symptoms. In addition, it could be manipulated
how many potential causes and/or risk factors of the condition
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are present. As well, the course of the condition (its develop-
ment over time) could be more or less typical. After creating
the cases, it would be important to assess how familiar partici-
pants are with these cases and how often they had heard about
a respective diagnosis and treatment before. This would indicate
whether participants could resort to their memory or would have
to engage in reasoning. Based on the case vignettes three types of
dependent variables could be collected. First participants could be
asked to name the patient’s problem. This would show how par-
ticipants would categorize the case. To collect quantitative data,
participants could be requested to rate how likely the person has
the respective condition. Second, participants could be asked to
explain the condition of the respective patient. Hence, they would
be asked to engage in diagnostic causal reasoning. Again, ratings
of potential causes could be collected as a quantitative measure.
Third, participants could be asked to choose a course of action,
that is, they would have to decide on a treatment. As before,
quantitative ratings of different treatments could be requested.
The research strategies outlined in the previous two para-
graphs combine elements from cognitive psychological, cul-
tural psychological and cognitive anthropological research. This
shows that these approaches are not incommensurate (Unsworth,
2012). Anthropological research does not only provide interest-
ing research questions (Whitehouse and Cohen, 2012), but also
methods to develop a deep understanding of the beliefs held
by people in different cultural groups as well as the inferences
and decisions that these people are likely to make (Astuti and
Bloch, 2012). Existing ethnographic research may already provide
descriptions of higher level theories, which are needed to conduct
the type of research proposed here. Murdock’s work (1980) is an
excellent example in this regard.
CONCLUSION
Research on systems of beliefs in different cultural groups and
cognitive psychological research on causal learning and reason-
ing can inform each other. In our view, they should inform
each other. In this paper, we derived predictions from cognitive-
psychological theories for systems of lay causal beliefs. Social
science and cognitive anthropological research can and—to some
degree—already does provide empirical results to test these pre-
dictions in different cultural groups. Moreover, in order to inves-
tigate causal learning and reasoning in everyday contexts, it is
necessary to know which causal beliefs people may bring to bear
when they are confronted with judgment and decision making
tasks. These beliefs range from abstract notions of causality to
causal models for particular issues. In addition, it is important
to know about other beliefs like moral convictions, which may
also affect causal judgments and decisions on actions (Liu and
Ditto, 2013). Only when these beliefs are known, it will be possi-
ble to study the interplay of causal beliefs and causal reasoning in
everyday life through experimental research.
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